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Abstract
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a standard tool for identifying good low-dimensional
approximations to data in high dimension. Many data sets of interest contain private or sensitive
information about individuals. Algorithms which operate on such data should be sensitive to
the privacy risks in publishing their outputs. Differential privacy is a framework for developing
tradeoffs between privacy and the utility of these outputs. In this paper we investigate the
theory and empirical performance of differentially private approximations to PCA and propose
a new method which explicitly optimizes the utility of the output. We show that the sample
complexity of the proposed method differs from the existing procedure in the scaling with the
data dimension, and that our method is nearly optimal in terms of this scaling. We furthermore
illustrate our results, showing that on real data there is a large performance gap between the
existing method and our method.
1 Introduction
Dimensionality reduction is a fundamental tool for understanding complex data sets that arise in
contemporary machine learning and data mining applications. Even though a single data point
can be represented by hundreds or even thousands of features, the phenomena of interest are often
intrinsically low-dimensional. By reducing the “extrinsic” dimension of the data to its “intrinsic” di-
mension, analysts can discover important structural relationships between features, more efficiently
use the transformed data for learning tasks such as classification or regression, and greatly reduce
the space required to store the data. One of the oldest and most classical methods for dimension-
ality reduction is principal components analysis (PCA), which computes a low-rank approximation
to the second moment matrix A of a set of points in Rd. The rank k of the approximation is chosen
to be the intrinsic dimension of the data. We view this procedure as specifying a k-dimensional
subspace of Rd.
Much of today’s machine-learning is performed on the vast amounts of personal information
collected by private companies and government agencies about individuals: examples include user
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or customer behaviors, demographic surveys, and test results from experimental subjects or pa-
tients. These datasets contain sensitive information about individuals and typically involve a large
number of features. It is therefore important to design machine-learning algorithms which discover
important structural relationships in the data while taking into account its sensitive nature. We
study approximations to PCA which guarantee differential privacy, a cryptographically motivated
definition of privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b) that has gained significant attention over the past few
years in the machine-learning and data-mining communities (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008; McSh-
erry and Mironov, 2009; McSherry, 2009; Friedman and Schuster, 2010; Mohammed et al., 2011).
Differential privacy measures privacy risk by a parameter p that bounds the log-likelihood ratio of
output of a (private) algorithm under two databases differing in a single individual.
There are many general tools for providing differential privacy. The sensitivity method due to
Dwork et al. (2006b) computes the desired algorithm (in our case, PCA) on the data and then adds
noise proportional to the maximum change than can be induced by changing a single point in the
data set. The PCA algorithm is very sensitive in this sense because the top eigenvector can change
by 90◦ by changing one point in the data set. Relaxations such as smoothed sensitivity (Nissim
et al., 2007) are difficult to compute in this setting as well. The SUb Linear Queries (SULQ) method
of Blum et al. (2005) adds noise to the second moment matrix and then runs PCA on the noisy
matrix. As our experiments show, the noise level required by SULQ may severely impact the quality
of approximation, making it impractical for data sets of moderate size.
The goal of this paper is to characterize the problem of differentially private PCA. We assume
that the algorithm is given n data points and a target dimension k and must produce a k-dimensional
subspace that approximates that produced by the standard PCA problem. We propose a new
algorithm, PPCA, which is an instance of the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar
(2007). Unlike SULQ, PPCA explicitly takes into account the quality of approximation—it outputs
a k-dimensional subspace which is biased towards subspaces close to the output of PCA. In our
case, the method corresponds to sampling from the matrix Bingham distribution. We implement
PPCA using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedure due to Hoff (2009); simulations
show that the subspace produced by PPCA captures more of the variance of A than SULQ. When
the MCMC procedure converges, the algorithm provides differential privacy.
In order to understand the performance gap, we prove sample complexity bounds for the case
of k = 1 for SULQ and PPCA, as well as a general lower bound on the sample complexity for
any differentially private algorithm. We show that the sample complexity scales as Ω(d3/2
√
log d)
for SULQ and as O(d) for PPCA. Furthermore, we show that any differentially private algorithm
requires Ω(d) samples. Therefore PPCA is nearly optimal in terms of sample complexity as a
function of data dimension. These theoretical results suggest that our experiments demonstrate
the limit of how well p-differentially private algorithms can perform, and our experiments show that
this gap should persist for general k. The result seems pessimistic for many applications, because
the sample complexity depends on the extrinsic dimension d rather than the intrinsic dimension k.
However, we believe this is a consequence of the fact that we make minimal assumptions on the
data; our results imply that, absent additional limitations on the data set, the sample complexity
differentially private PCA must grow linearly with the data dimension.
There are several interesting open questions suggested by this work. One set of issues is compu-
tational. Differentially privacy is a mathematical definition, but algorithms must be implemented
using finite precision machines. Privacy and computation interact in many places, including pseu-
dorandomness, numerical stability, optimization, and in the MCMC procedure we use to implement
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PPCA; investigating the impact of approximate sampling is an avenue for future work. A second set
of issues is theoretical—while the privacy guarantees of PPCA hold for all k, our theoretical analysis
of sample complexity applies only to k = 1 in which the distance and angles between vectors are
related. An interesting direction is to develop theoretical bounds for general k; challenges here are
providing the right notion of approximation of PCA, and extending the theory using packings of
Grassmann or Stiefel manifolds. Finally, in this work we assume k is given to the algorithm, but
in many applications k is chosen after looking at the data. Under differential privacy, the selection
of k itself must be done in a differentially private manner.
Related Work
Differential privacy was first proposed by Dwork et al. (2006b). There has been an extensive
literature following this work in the computer science theory, machine learning, and databases
communities. A survey of some of the theoretical work can be found in the survey by Dwork and
Smith (2009). Differential privacy has been shown to have strong semantic guarantees (Dwork et al.,
2006b; Kasiviswanathan and Smith, 2008) and is resistant to many attacks (Ganta et al., 2008)
that succeed against alternative definitions of privacy. In particular, so-called syntactic definitions
of privacy (Sweeney, 2002; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Li et al., 2010) may be susceptible to
attacks based on side-information about individuals in the database.
There are several general approaches to constructing differentially private approximations to
some desired algorithm or computation. Input perturbation (Blum et al., 2005) adds noise to
the data prior to performing the desired computation, whereas output perturbation (Dwork et al.,
2006b) adds noise to the output of the desired computation. The exponential mechanism (McSherry
and Talwar, 2007) can be used to perform differentially private selection based on a score function
that measures the quality of different outputs. Objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) adds
noise to the objective function for algorithms which are convex optimizations. These approaches
and related ideas such as (Nissim et al., 2007; Dwork and Lei, 2009) have been used to approximate
a variety of statistical, machine learning, and data mining tasks under differential privacy (Barak
et al., 2007; Wasserman and Zhou, 2010; Smith, 2011; McSherry and Mironov, 2009; Williams and
McSherry, 2010; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Rubinstein et al., 2012; Nissim et al., 2007; Blum et al.,
2008; McSherry and Talwar, 2007; Friedman and Schuster, 2010; Hardt and Roth, 2012).
This paper deals with the problem of differentially private approximations to PCA. Prior to
our work, the only proposed method for PCA was the Sub-Linear Queries (SULQ) method of Blum
et al. (2005). This approach adds noise to the second moment matrix of the data before calculating
the singular value decomposition. By contrast, our algorithm, PPCA, uses the exponential mecha-
nism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007) to choose a k-dimensional subspace biased toward those which
capture more of “energy” of the matrix. Subsequent to our work, Kapralov and Talwar (2013)
have proposed a dynamic programming algorithm for differentially private low rank matrix approx-
imation which involves sampling from a distribution induced by the exponential mechanism. The
running time of their algorithm is O(d6), where d is the data dimension, and it is unclear how this
may affect its implementation. Hardt and Roth (Hardt and Roth, 2012, 2013) have studied low-
rank matrix approximation under additional incoherence assumptions on the data. In particular,
Hardt and Roth (2012) consider the problem of differentially-private low-rank matrix reconstruc-
tion for applications to sparse matrices; provided certain coherence conditions hold, they provide
an algorithm for constructing a rank 2k approximation B to a matrix A such that ‖A − B‖F is
O(‖A− Ak‖) plus some additional terms which depend on d, k and n; here Ak is the best rank k
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approximation to A. Hardt and Roth (2013) show a method for guaranteeing differential privacy
under an entry-wise neighborhood condition using the power method for calculating singular values.
Because of the additional assumptions and different model, these results are generally incomparable
to ours.
In addition to these works, other researchers have examined the interplay between projections
and differential privacy. Zhou et al. (2009) analyze a differentially private data release scheme
where a random linear transformation is applied to data to preserve differential privacy, and then
measures how much this transformation affects the utility of a PCA of the data. One example of
a random linear transformation is random projection, popularized by the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
(JL) transform. Blocki et al. (2012) show that the JL transform of the data preserves differential
privacy provided the minimum singular value of the data matrix is large. Kenthapadi et al. (2013)
study the problem of estimating the distance between data points with differential privacy using a
random projection of the data points.
There has been significant work on other notions of privacy based on manipulating entries
within the database (Sweeney, 2002; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Li et al., 2010), for example by
reducing the resolution of certain features to create ambiguities. For more details on these and
other alternative notions of privacy see Fung et al. (2010) for a survey with more references. An
alternative line of privacy-preserving data-mining work (Zhan and Matwin, 2007) is in the Secure
Multiparty Computation setting; one work (Han et al., 2009) studies privacy-preserving singular
value decomposition in this model. Finally, dimension reduction through random projection has
been considered as a technique for sanitizing data prior to publication (Liu et al., 2006); our work
differs from this line of work in that we offer differential privacy guarantees, and we only release
the PCA subspace, not actual data.
2 Preliminaries
The data given to our algorithm is a set of n vectors D = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} where each xi corresponds
to the private value of one individual, xi ∈ Rd, and ‖xi‖ ≤ 1 for all i. Let X = [x1, . . . , xn] be the
matrix whose columns are the data vectors {xi}. Let A = 1nXXT denote the d× d second moment
matrix of the data. The matrix A is positive semidefinite, and has Frobenius norm ‖A‖F at most
1.
The problem of dimensionality reduction is to find a “good” low-rank approximation to A. A
popular solution is to compute a rank-k matrix Aˆ which minimizes the norm ‖A − Aˆ‖F, where k
is much lower than the data dimension d. The Schmidt approximation theorem (Stewart, 1993)
shows that the minimizer is given by the singular value decomposition, also known as the PCA
algorithm in some areas of computer science.
Definition 1. Suppose A is a positive semidefinite matrix whose first k eigenvalues are distinct.
Let the eigenvalues of A be λ1(A) ≥ λ2(A) ≥ · · · ≥ λd(A) ≥ 0 and let Λ be a diagonal matrix with
Λii = λi(A). The matrix A decomposes as
A = V ΛV T , (1)
where V is an orthonormal matrix of eigenvectors. The top-k PCA subspace of A is the matrix
Vk(A) = [v1 v2 · · · vk] , (2)
where vi is the i-th column of V in (1). The k-th eigengap is ∆k = λk − λk+1.
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Given the top-k subspace and the eigenvalue matrix Λ, we can form an approximation A(k) =
Vk(A)ΛkVk(A)
T to A, where Λk contains the k largest eigenvalues in Λ. In the special case k = 1 we
have A(1) = λ1(A)v1v
T
1 , where v1 is the eigenvector corresponding to λ1(A). We refer to v1 as the
top eigenvector of the data, and ∆ = ∆1 is the eigengap. For a d× k matrix Vˆ with orthonormal
columns, the quality of Vˆ in approximating Vk(A) can be measured by
qF(Vˆ ) = tr
(
Vˆ TAVˆ
)
. (3)
The Vˆ which maximizes q(Vˆ ) has columns equal to {vi : i ∈ [k]}, corresponding to the top-k
eigenvectors of A.
Our theoretical results on the utility of our PCA approximation apply to the special case k = 1.
We prove results about the inner product between the output vector vˆ1 and the true top eigenvector
v1:
qA(vˆ1) = |〈vˆ1, v1〉| . (4)
The utility in (4) is related to (3). If we write vˆ1 in the basis spanned by {vi}, then
qF(vˆ1) = λ1qA(vˆ1)
2 +
d∑
i=2
λi〈vˆ1, vi〉2.
Our proof techniques use the geometric properties of qA(·).
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm A(·) is an (ρ, η)-close approximation to the top eigenvector
if for all data sets D of n points we have
P (qA(A(D)) ≥ ρ) ≥ 1− η,
where the probability is taken over A(·).
We study approximations to A to PCA that preserve the privacy of the underlying data. The
notion of privacy that we use is differential privacy, which quantifies the privacy guaranteed by a
randomized algorithm A applied to a data set D.
Definition 3. An algorithm A(B) taking values in a set T provides p-differential privacy if
sup
S
sup
D,D′
µ (S | B = D)
µ (S | B = D′) ≤ e
p ,
where the first supremum is over all measurable S ⊆ T , the second is over all data sets D and D′
differing in a single entry, and µ(·|B) is the conditional distribution (measure) on T induced by
the output A(B) given a data set B. The ratio is interpreted to be 1 whenever the numerator and
denominator are both 0.
Definition 4. An algorithm A(B) taking values in a set T provides (p, δ)-differential privacy if
P (A(D) ∈ S) ≤ epP (A(D′) ∈ S)+ δ,
for all measurable S ⊆ T and all data sets D and D′ differing in a single entry.
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Here p and δ are privacy parameters, where low p and δ ensure more privacy (Dwork et al.,
2006b; Wasserman and Zhou, 2010; Dwork et al., 2006a). The second privacy guarantee is weaker;
the parameter δ bounds the probability of failure, and is typically chosen to be quite small. In our
experiments we chose small but constant δ—Ganta et al. (2008) suggest δ < 1
n2
is more appropriate.
In this paper we are interested in proving results on the sample complexity of differentially
private algorithms that approximate PCA. That is, for a given p and ρ, how large must the
number of individuals n in the data set be such that the algorithm is both p-differentially private
and a (ρ, η)-close approximation to PCA? It is well known that as the number of individuals n
grows, it is easier to guarantee the same level of privacy with relatively less noise or perturbation,
and therefore the utility of the approximation also improves. Our results characterize how the
privacy p and utility ρ scale with n and the tradeoff between them for fixed n. We show that the
sample complexity depends on the eigengap ∆.
3 Algorithms and results
In this section we describe differentially private techniques for approximating (2). The first is a
modified version of the Sub-Linear Queries (SULQ) method (Blum et al., 2005). Our new algo-
rithm for differentially-private PCA, PPCA, is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism due
to McSherry and Talwar (2007). Both procedures are differentially private approximations to the
top-k subspace: SULQ guarantees (p, δ)-differential privacy and PPCA guarantees p-differential
privacy.
3.1 Input perturbation
The only differentially-private approximation to PCA prior to this work is the SULQ method (Blum
et al., 2005). The SULQ method perturbs each entry of the empirical second moment matrix A
to ensure differential privacy and releases the top-k eigenvectors of this perturbed matrix. More
specifically, SULQ recommends adding a matrix N of i.i.d. Gaussian noise of variance 8d
2 log2(d/δ)
n22p
and applies the PCA algorithm to A + N . This guarantees a weaker privacy definition known as
(p, δ)-differential privacy. One problem with this approach is that with probability 1 the matrix
A+N is not symmetric, so the largest eigenvalue may not be real and the entries of the corresponding
eigenvector may be complex. Thus the SULQ algorithm, as written, is not a good candidate for
approximating PCA.
It is easy to modify SULQ to produce a an eigenvector with real entries that guarantees (p, δ)
differential privacy. In Algorithm 1, instead of adding an asymmetric Gaussian matrix, we add a
symmetric matrix with i.i.d. Gaussian entries N . That is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d, the variable Nij is
an independent Gaussian random variable with variance β2. Note that this matrix is symmetric
but not necessarily positive semidefinite, so some eigenvalues may be negative but the eigenvectors
are all real. A derivation for the noise variance in (5) of Algorithm 1 is given in Theorem 1. An
alternative is to add Laplace noise of an appropriate variance to each entry—this would guarantee
p-differential privacy.
3.2 Exponential mechanism
Our new method, PPCA, randomly samples a k-dimensional subspace from a distribution that
ensures differential privacy and is biased towards high utility. The distribution from which our
6
Algorithm 1: Algorithm MOD-SULQ (input pertubation)
inputs: d× n data matrix X, privacy parameter p, parameter δ
outputs: d× k matrix Vˆk = [vˆ1 vˆ2 · · · vˆk] with orthonormal columns
1 Set A = 1nXX
T .;
2 Set
β =
d+ 1
np
√
2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
)
+
1
n
√
p
. (5)
Generate a d× d symmetric random matrix N whose entries are i.i.d. drawn from N (0, β2).
;
3 Compute Vˆk = Vk(A+N) according to (2). ;
released subspace is sampled is known in the statistics literature as the matrix Bingham distri-
bution (Chikuse, 2003), which we denote by BMFk(B). The algorithm and its privacy properties
apply to general k < d but our theoretical results on the utility focus on the special case k = 1.
The matrix Bingham distribution takes values on the set of all k-dimensional subspaces of Rd and
has a density equal to
f(V ) =
1
F1 1
(
1
2k,
1
2d,B
) exp(tr(V TBV )), (6)
where V is a d × k matrix whose columns are orthonormal and F1 1
(
1
2k,
1
2d,B
)
is a confluent
hypergeometric function (Chikuse, 2003, p.33).
Algorithm 2: Algorithm PPCA (exponential mechanism)
inputs: d× n data matrix X, privacy parameter p, dimension k
outputs: d× k matrix Vˆk = [vˆ1 vˆ2 · · · vˆk] with orthonormal columns
1 Set A = 1nXX
T ;
2 Sample Vˆk = BMF
(
n
p
2 A
)
;
By combining results on the exponential mechanism along with properties of PCA algorithm,
we can show that this procedure is differentially private. In many cases, sampling from the dis-
tribution specified by the exponential mechanism may be expensive computationally, especially
for continuous-valued outputs. We implement PPCA using a recently-proposed Gibbs sampler due
to Hoff (2009). Gibbs sampling is a popular Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique in
which samples are generated according to a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the
density in (6). Assessing the “burn-in time” and other factors for this procedure is an interesting
question in its own right; further details are in Section 6.2.
3.3 Other approaches
There are other general algorithmic strategies for guaranteeing differential privacy. The sensitivity
method (Dwork et al., 2006b) adds noise proportional to the maximum change that can be induced
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by changing a single point in the data set. Consider a data set D with m+1 copies of a unit vector u
andm copies of a unit vector u′ with u ⊥ u′ and letD′ havem copies of u andm+1 copies of u′. Then
v1(D) = u but v1(D′) = u′, so ‖v1(D)− v1(D′)‖ =
√
2. Thus the global sensitivity does not scale
with the number of data points, so as n increases the variance of the noise required by the sensitivity
method will not decrease. An alternative to global sensitivity is smooth sensitivity (Nissim et al.,
2007). Except for special cases, such as the sample median, smooth sensitivity is difficult to
compute for general functions. A third method for computing private, approximate solutions
to high-dimensional optimization problems is objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al., 2011); to
apply this method, we require the optimization problems to have certain properties (namely, strong
convexity and bounded norms of gradients), which do not apply to PCA.
3.4 Main results
Our theoretical results are sample complexity bounds for PPCA and MOD-SULQ as well as a general
lower bound on the sample complexity for any p-differentially private algorithm. These results show
that the PPCA is nearly optimal in terms of the scaling of the sample complexity with respect to
the data dimension d, privacy parameter p, and eigengap ∆. We further show that MOD-SULQ
requires more samples as a function of d, despite having a slightly weaker privacy guarantee. Proofs
are presented in Sections 4 and 5.
Even though both algorithms can output the top-k PCA subspace for general k ≤ d, we prove
results for the case k = 1. Finding the scaling behavior of the sample complexity with k is an
interesting open problem that we leave for future work; challenges here are finding the right notion
of approximation of the PCA, and extending the theory using packings of Grassman or Stiefel
manifolds.
Theorem 1. For the β in (5) Algorithm MOD-SULQ is (p, δ) differentially private.
Theorem 2. Algorithm PPCA is p-differentially private.
The fact that these two algorithms are differentially private follows from some simple calcu-
lations. Our first sample complexity result provides an upper bound on the number of samples
required by PPCA to guarantee a certain level of privacy and accuracy. The sample complexity of
PPCA grows linearly with the dimension d, inversely with p, and inversely with the correlation gap
(1− ρ) and eigenvalue gap ∆. These sample complexity results hold for k = 1.
Theorem 3 (Sample complexity of PPCA). If
n >
d
p∆(1− ρ)
(
4
log(1/η)
d
+ 2 log
8λ1
(1− ρ2)∆
)
,
then the top PCA direction v1 and the output of PPCA vˆ1 with privacy parameter p satisfy
Pr(|〈v1, vˆ1〉| > ρ) ≥ 1− η.
That is, PPCA is a (ρ, η)-close approximation to PCA.
Our second result shows a lower bound on the number of samples required by any p-differentially-
private algorithm to guarantee a certain level of accuracy for a large class of datasets, and uses
proof techniques in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2011, 2012).
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Theorem 4 (Sample complexity lower bound). Fix d ≥ 3, p, ∆ ≤ 12 and let
1− φ = exp
(
−2 · ln 8 + ln(1 + exp(d))
d− 2
)
.
For any ρ ≥ 1− 1−φ16 , no p-differentially private algorithm A can approximate PCA with expected
utility greater than ρ on all databases with n points in dimension d having eigenvalue gap ∆, where
n <
d
p∆
max
{
1,
√
1− φ
80(1− ρ)
}
.
Theorem 3 shows that if n scales like dp∆(1−ρ) log
1
1−ρ2 then PPCA produces an approximation
vˆ1 that has correlation ρ with v1, whereas Theorem 4 shows that n must scale like
d
p∆
√
(1−ρ) for
any p-differentially private algorithm. In terms of scaling with d, p and ∆, the upper and lower
bounds match, and they also match up to square-root factors with respect to the correlation. By
contrast, the following lower bound on the number of samples required by MOD-SULQ to ensure a
certain level of accuracy shows that MOD-SULQ has a less favorable scaling with dimension.
Theorem 5 (Sample complexity lower bound for MOD-SULQ). There are constants c and c′ such
that if
n < c
d3/2
√
log(d/δ)
p
(1− c′(1− ρ)),
then there is a dataset of size n in dimension d such that the top PCA direction v and the output
vˆ of MOD-SULQ satisfy E [|〈vˆ1, v1〉|] ≤ ρ.
Notice that the dependence on n grows as d3/2 in SULQ as opposed to d in PPCA. Dimensionality
reduction via PCA is often used in applications where the data points occupy a low dimensional
space but are presented in high dimensions. These bounds suggest that PPCA is better suited to
such applications than MOD-SULQ.
4 Analysis of PPCA
In this section we provide theoretical guarantees on the performance of PPCA. The proof of Theorem
2 follows from the results on the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007). To find the
sample complexity of PPCA we bound the density of the Bingham distribution, leading to a sample
complexity for k = 1 that depends on the gap λ1 − λ2 between the top two eigenvalues. We also
prove a general lower bound on the sample complexity that holds for any p-differentially private
algorithm. The lower bound matches our upper bound up to log factors, showing that PPCA is
nearly optimal in terms of the scaling with dimension, privacy p, and utility qA(·).
4.1 Privacy guarantee
We first give a proof of Theorem 2.
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Proof. Let X be a data matrix whose i-th column is xi and A =
1
nXX
T . The PP-PCA algorithm is
the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar (2007) applied to the score function n · vTAv.
Consider X ′ = [x1 x2 · · · xn−1 x′n] differing from X in a single column and let A′ = 1nX ′X ′T . We
have
max
v∈Sd−1
∣∣n · vTA′v − n · vTAv∣∣ ≤ ∣∣vT (x′nx′Tn − xnxTn )v∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∥∥vTx′n∥∥2 − ∥∥vTxn∥∥2∣∣∣
≤ 1.
The last step follows because ‖xi‖ ≤ 1 for all i. The result now follows immediately from McSherry
and Talwar (2007, Theorem 6).
4.2 Upper bound on utility
The results on the exponential mechanism bound the gap between the value of the function qF(vˆ1) =
n · vˆT1 Avˆ1 evaluated at the output vˆ1 of the mechanism and the optimal value q(v1) = n · λ1. We
derive a bound on the correlation qA(vˆ1) = |〈vˆ1, v1〉| via geometric arguments.
Lemma 6 (Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 of Ball (1997)). Let µ be the uniform measure on the unit sphere
Sd−1. For any x ∈ Sd−1 and 0 ≤ c < 1 the following bounds hold:
1
2
exp
(
−d− 1
2
log
2
1− c
)
≤ µ
({
v ∈ Sd−1 : 〈v, x〉 ≥ c
})
≤ exp (−dc2/2) .
We are now ready to provide a proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. Fix a privacy level p, target correlation ρ, and probability η. Let X be the data matrix
and B = (p/2)XX
T and
Uρ = {u : |〈u, v1〉| ≥ ρ} .
be the union of the two spherical caps centered at ±v1. Let Uρ denote the complement of Uρ in
Sd−1.
An output vector vˆ1 is “good” if it is in Uρ. We first give some bounds on the score function
qF(u) on the boundary between Uρ and Uρ, where 〈u, v1〉 = ±ρ. On this boundary, the function
qF(u) is maximized when u is a linear combination of v1 and v2, the top two eigenvectors of A. It
minimized when u is a linear combination of v1 and vd. Therefore
qF(u) ≤ np
2
(ρ2λ1 + (1− ρ2)λ2) u ∈ Uρ (7)
qF(u) ≥ np
2
(ρ2λ1 + (1− ρ2)λd) u ∈ Uρ. (8)
Let µ(·) denote the uniform measure on the unit sphere. Then fixing an 0 ≤ b < 1, using (7),
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(8), and the fact that λd ≥ 0,
P
(Uρ) ≤ P (Uρ)P (Uσ)
=
1
F1 1(
1
2
k, 1
2
m,B)
∫
Uρ exp
(
uTBu
)
dµ
1
F1 1(
1
2
k, 1
2
m,B)
∫
Uσ exp (u
TBu) dµ
≤ exp
(
n(p/2)
(
ρ2λ1 + (1− ρ2)λ2
)) · µ (Uρ)
exp (n(p/2) (σ2λ1 + (1− σ2)λd)) · µ (Uσ)
≤ exp
(
−np
2
(
σ2λ1 − (ρ2λ1 + (1− ρ2)λ2)
)) · µ (Uρ)
µ (Uσ) . (9)
Applying the lower bound from Lemma 6 to the denominator of (9) and the upper bound µ
(Uρ) ≤ 1
yields
P
(Uρ) ≤ exp(−np
2
(
σ2λ1 − (ρ2λ1 + (1− ρ2)λ2)
)) · exp(d− 1
2
log
2
1− σ
)
. (10)
We must choose a σ2 > ρ2 to make the upper bound smaller than 1. More precisely,
σ2 > ρ2 + (1− ρ2)λ2
λ1
1− σ2 < (1− ρ2)
(
1− λ2
λ1
)
.
For simplicity, choose
1− σ2 = 1
2
(1− ρ2)
(
1− λ2
λ1
)
.
So that
σ2λ1 − (ρ2λ1 + (1− ρ2)λ2) = (1− ρ2)λ1 − (1− σ2)λ1 − (1− ρ2)λ2
= (1− ρ2)
(
λ1 − 1
2
(λ1 − λ2)− λ2
)
=
1
2
(1− ρ2)(λ1 − λ2)
and
log
2
1− σ < log
4
1− σ2
= log
8λ1
(1− ρ2)(λ1 − λ2) .
Setting the right hand side of (10) less than η yields
np
4
(1− ρ2)(λ1 − λ2) > log 1
η
+
d− 1
2
log
8λ1
(1− ρ2)(λ1 − λ2) .
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Because 1− ρ < 1− ρ2, if we choose
n >
d
p(1− ρ)(λ1 − λ2)
(
4
log(1/η)
d
+ 2 log
8λ1
(1− ρ2)(λ1 − λ2)
)
,
then the output of PPCA will produce a vˆ1 such that
P (|〈vˆ1, v1〉| < ρ) < η.
4.3 Lower bound on utility
We now turn to a general lower bound on the sample complexity for any differentially private
approximation to PCA. We construct K databases which differ in a small number of points whose
top eigenvectors are not too far from each other. For such a collection, Lemma 8 shows that for any
differentially private mechanism, the average correlation over the collection cannot be too large.
That is, any p-differentially private mechanism cannot have high utility on all K data sets. The
remainder of the argument is to construct these K data sets.
The proof uses some simple eigenvalue and eigenvector computations. A matrix of positive
entries
A =
(
a b
b c
)
(11)
has characteristic polynomial
det(A− λI) = λ2 − (a+ c)λ+ (ac− b2)
and eigenvalues
λ =
1
2
(a+ c)± 1
2
√
(a+ c)2 − 4(ac− b2)
=
1
2
(a+ c)± 1
2
√
(a− c)2 + 4b2.
The eigenvectors are in the directions (b,−(a− λ))T .
We will also need the following Lemma, which is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 7 (Simple packing set). For φ ∈ [(2pid)−1/2, 1), there exists a set of
K =
1
8
exp
(
(d− 1) log 1√
1− φ2
)
(12)
vectors C in Sd−1 such that for any pair µ, ν ∈ C, the inner product between them is upper bounded
by φ:
|〈µ, ν〉| ≤ φ.
The following Lemma gives a lower bound on the expected utility averaged over a set of
databases which differ in a “small” number of elements.
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Lemma 8. Let D1,D2, . . . ,DK be K databases which differ in the value of at most ln(K−1)p points,
and let u1, . . . , uK be the top eigenvectors of D1,D2, . . . ,DK . If A is any p-differentially private
algorithm, then,
K∑
i=1
EA [|〈A(Di), ui〉|] ≤ K
(
1− 1
16
(1−max |〈ui, uj〉|)
)
.
Proof. Let
t = min
i 6=j
(‖ui − uj‖ , ‖ui + uj‖),
and Gi be the “double cap” around ±ui of radius t/2:
Gi = {u : ‖u− ui‖ < t/2} ∪ {u : ‖u+ ui‖ < t/2} .
We claim that
K∑
i=1
PA(A(Di) /∈ Gi) ≥ 1
2
(K − 1). (13)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the claim is false. Because all of the caps Gi are disjoint,
and applying the definition of differential privacy,
1
2
(K − 1) >
K∑
i=1
PA(A(Di) /∈ Gi)
≥
K∑
i=1
∑
i′ 6=i
PA(A(Di) ∈ Gi′)
≥
K∑
i=1
∑
i′ 6=i
e−p·ln(K−1)/pPA(A(Di′) ∈ Gi′)
≥ (K − 1) · 1
K − 1 ·
K∑
i=1
PA(A(Di) ∈ Gi)
≥ K − 1
2
(K − 1),
which is a contradiction, so (13) holds. Therefore by the Markov inequality
K∑
i=1
EA
[
min(‖A(Di)− ui‖2 , ‖A(Di) + ui‖2)
]
≥
K∑
i=1
P(A(Di) /∈ Gi) · t
2
4
≥ 1
8
(K − 1)t2.
Rewriting the norms in terms of inner products shows
2K − 2
K∑
i=1
EA [|〈A(Di), ui〉|] ≥ 1
8
(K − 1) (2− 2 max |〈ui, uj〉|) ,
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so
K∑
i=1
EA [|〈A(Di), ui〉|] ≤ K
(
1− 1
8
K − 1
K
(1−max |〈ui, uj〉|)
)
≤ K
(
1− 1
16
(1−max |〈ui, uj〉|)
)
.
We can now prove Theorem 4.
Proof. From Lemma 8, given a set of K databases differing in ln(K−1)p points with top eigenvectors
{ui : i = 1, 2, . . . ,K}, for at least one database i,
EA [|〈A(Di), ui〉|] ≤ 1− 1
16
(1−max |〈ui, uj〉|)
for any p-differentially private algorithm. Setting the left side equal to some target ρ,
1− ρ ≥ 1
16
(1−max |〈ui, uj〉|) . (14)
So our goal is construct these data bases such that the inner product between their eigenvectors is
small.
Let y = ed, the d-th coordinate vector, and let φ ∈ ((2pid)−1/2, 1). Lemma 7 shows that there
exists a packing W = {w1, w2, . . . , wK} of the sphere Sd−2 spanned by {e1, e2, . . . , ed−1} such that
maxi 6=j |〈wi, wj〉| ≤ φ, where
K =
1
8
(1− φ)−(d−2)/2.
Choose φ such that ln(K − 1) = d. This means
1− φ = exp
(
−2 · ln 8 + ln(1 + exp(d))
d− 2
)
.
The right side is minimized for d = 3 but this leads to a weak lower bound 1− φ > 3.5× 10−5. By
contrast, for d = 100, the bound is 1− φ > 0.12. In all cases, 1− φ is at least a constant value.
We construct a database with n points for each wi. Let β =
d
np
. For now, we assume that
β ≤ ∆ ≤ 12 . The other case, when β ≥ ∆ will be considered later. Because β ≤ ∆, we have
n >
d
p∆
.
The construction uses a parameter 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 that will be set as a function of the eigenvalue gap
∆. We will derive conditions on n based on the requirements on d, p, ρ, and ∆. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,K
let the data set Di contain
• n(1− β) copies of √my
• nβ copies of zi = 1√2y +
1√
2
wi.
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Thus datasets Di and Dj differ in the values of nβ = ln(K−1)np individuals. The second moment
matrix Ai of Di is
Ai = ((1− β)m+ 1
2
β)yyT +
1
2
β(wTi y + yw
T
i ) +
1
2
βwiw
T
i .
By choosing an basis containing y and wi, we can write this as
Ai =
 (1− β)m+ 12β 12β 01
2β
1
2β 0
0 0 0
 .
This is in the form (11), with a = (1− β)m+ 12β, b = 12β, and c = 12β.
The matrix Ai has two nonzero eigenvalues given by
λ =
1
2
(a+ c) +
1
2
√
(a− c)2 + 4b2, (15)
λ′ =
1
2
(a+ c)− 1
2
√
(a− c)2 + 4b2,
The gap ∆ between the top two eigenvalues is:
∆ =
√
(a− c)2 + 4b2 =
√
m2(1− β)2 + β2.
We can thus set m in the construction to ensure an eigengap of ∆:
m =
√
(∆2 − β2)
1− β . (16)
The top eigenvector of Ai is given by
ui =
b√
b2 + (a− λ)2 y +
(a− λ)√
b2 + (a− λ)2wi.
where λ is given by (15). Therefore
max
i 6=j
|〈ui, uj〉| ≤ b
2
b2 + (a− λ)2 +
(a− λ)2
b2 + (a− λ)2 maxi 6=j |〈wi, wj〉|
≤ 1− (a− λ)
2
b2 + (a− λ)2 (1− φ). (17)
To obtain an upper bound on maxi 6=j |〈ui, uj〉| we must lower bound (a−λ)
2
b2+(a−λ)2 .
Since x/(ν + x) is monotonically increasing in x when ν > 0, we will find a lower bound on
(a− λ). Observe that from (15),
λ− a = b
2
λ− c .
So to lower bound λ− a we need to upper bound λ− c. We have
λ− c = 1
2
(a− c) + 1
2
∆ =
1
2
((1− β)m+ ∆) .
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Because b = β/2,
(λ− a)2 >
(
β2
2((1− β)m+ ∆)
)2
=
β4
4((1− β)m+ ∆)2 .
Now,
(a− λ)2
b2 + (a− λ)2 >
β4
β2((1− β)m+ ∆)2 + β4
=
β2
β2 + ((1− β)m+ ∆)2
>
β2
5∆2
, (18)
where the last step follows by plugging in m from (16) and using the fact that β ≤ ∆. Putting it
all together, we have from (14), (17), and (18), and using the fact that φ is such that ln(K−1) = d
and β = dnp ,
1− ρ ≥ 1
16
· (a− λ)
2
b2 + (a− λ)2 (1− φ)
>
1− φ
80
β2
∆2
=
1− φ
80
· d
2
n22p∆
2
,
which implies
n >
d
p∆
√
1− φ
80(1− ρ) .
Thus for β ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/2, any p-differentially private algorithm needs Ω
(
d
p∆
√
1−ρ
)
points to get
expected inner product ρ on all data sets with eigengap ∆.
We now consider the case where β > ∆. We choose a slightly different construction here. The
i-th database now consists of n(1 − β) copies of the 0 vector, and nβ copies of ∆β wi. Thus, every
pair of databases differ in the values of nβ = ln(K−1)p people, and the eigenvalue gap between the
top two eigenvectors is β · ∆β = ∆.
As the top eigenvector of the i-th database is ui = wi,
max
i 6=j
|〈ui, uj〉| = max
i 6=j
|〈wi, wj〉| ≤ φ.
Combining this with (14), we obtain
1− ρ ≥ 1
16
(1− φ),
which provides the additional condition in the Theorem.
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5 Analysis of MOD-SULQ
In this section we provide theoretical guarantees on the performance of the MOD-SULQ algorithm.
Theorem 1 shows that MOD-SULQ is (p, δ)-differentially private. Theorem 11 provides a lower
bound on the distance between the vector released by MOD-SULQ and the true top eigenvector
in terms of the privacy parameters p and δ and the number of points n in the data set. This
implicitly gives a lower bound on the sample complexity of MOD-SULQ. We provide some graphical
illustration of this tradeoff.
The following upper bound will be useful for future calculations : for two unit vectors x and y,∑
1≤i≤j≤d
(xixj − yiyj)2 ≤ 2. (19)
Note that this upper bound is achievable by setting x and y to be orthogonal elementary vectors.
5.1 Privacy guarantee
We first justify the choice of β2 in the MOD-SULQ algorithm by proving Theorem 1.
Proof. Let B and Bˆ be two independent symmetric random matrices where {Bij : 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d}
and {Bˆij : 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d} are each sets of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and
variance β2. Consider two data sets D = {xi : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} and Dˆ = D1 ∪ {xˆn} \ {xn} and let A
and Aˆ denote their second moment matrices. Let G = A + B and Gˆ = Aˆ + Bˆ. We first calculate
the log ratio of the densities of G and Gˆ at a point H:
log
fG(H)
fGˆ(H)
=
∑
1≤i≤j≤d
(
− 1
2β2
(Hij −Aij)2 + 1
2β2
(Hij − Aˆij)2
)
=
1
2β2
∑
1≤i≤j≤d
(
2
n
(Hij −Aij)(xn,ixn,j − xˆn,ixˆn,j) + 1
n2
(xˆn,ixˆn,j − xn,ixn,j)2
)
.
From (19) the last term is upper bounded by 2/n2. To upper bound the first term,∑
1≤i≤j≤d
|xˆn,ixˆn,j − xn,ixn,j | ≤ 2 max
a:‖a‖≤1
∑
1≤i≤j≤d
aiaj
≤ 2 · 1
2
(d2 + d) · 1
d
= d+ 1.
Note that this bound is not too loose—by taking xˆ = d−1/21 and x = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T , this term is
still linear in d.
Then for any measurable set S of matrices,
P (G ∈ S) ≤ exp
(
1
2β2
(
2
n
(d+ 1)γ +
3
n2
))
P
(
Gˆ ∈ S
)
+ P (Bij > γ for all i, j) . (20)
To handle the last term, use a union bound over the (d2 + d)/2 variables {Bij} together with
the tail bound, which holds for γ > β:
P (Bij > γ) ≤ 1√
2pi
e−γ
2/2β2 .
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Thus setting P (Bij > γ for some i, j) = δ yields the condition
δ =
d2 + d
2
√
2pi
e−γ
2/2β2 .
Rearranging to solve for γ gives
γ = max
(
β, β
√
2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
))
= β
√
2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
)
for d > 1 and δ < 3/
√
2pie. This then gives an expression for p to make (20) imply (p, δ) differential
privacy:
p =
1
2β2
(
2
n
(d+ 1)γ +
2
n2
)
=
1
2β2
(
2
n
(d+ 1)β
√
2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
)
+
2
n2
)
.
Solving for β using the quadratic formula yields the particularly messy expression in (5):
β =
d+ 1
2np
√
2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
)
+
1
2np
(
2(d+ 1)2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
)
+ 4p
)1/2
≤ d+ 1
np
√
2 log
(
d2 + d
δ2
√
2pi
)
+
1√
pn
.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 5
In this section we provide theoretical guarantees on the performance of the MOD-SULQ algorithm.
Theorem 1 shows that MOD-SULQ is (p, δ)-differentially private. Theorem 11 provides a lower
bound on the distance between the vector released by MOD-SULQ and the true top eigenvector
in terms of the privacy parameters p and δ and the number of points n in the data set. This
implicitly gives a lower bound on the sample complexity of MOD-SULQ. We provide some graphical
illustration of this tradeoff. The main tool in our lower bound is a generalization by Yu (1997) of
an information-theoretic inequality due to Fano.
Theorem 9 (Fano’s inequality (Yu, 1997)). Let R be a set and Θ be a parameter space with a
pseudo-metric d(·). Let F be a set of r densities {f1, . . . , fr} on R corresponding to parameter
values {θ1, . . . , θr} in Θ. Let X have distribution f ∈ F with corresponding parameter θ and let
θˆ(X) be an estimate of θ. If, for all i and j
d(θi, θj) ≥ τ
and
KL (fi‖fj) ≤ γ,
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then
max
j
Ej [d(θˆ, θj)] ≥ τ
2
(
1− γ + log 2
log r
)
,
where Ej [·] denotes the expectation with respect to distribution fj.
To use this inequality, we will construct a set of densities on the set of covariance matrices
corresponding distribution of the random matrix in the MOD-SULQ algorithm under different
inputs. These inputs will be chosen using a set of unit vectors which are a packing on the surface
of the unit sphere.
Lemma 10. Let Σ be a positive definite matrix and let f denote the density N (a,Σ) and g denote
the density N (b,Σ). Then KL (f‖g) = 12(a− b)TΣ−1(a− b).
Proof. This is a simple calculation:
KL (f‖g) = Ex∼f
[
−1
2
(x− a)TΣ−1(x− a) + 1
2
(x− b)Σ−1(x− b)
]
=
1
2
(
aTΣ−1a− aTΣ−1b− bTΣ−1a+ bTΣ−1b)
=
1
2
(a− b)TΣ−1(a− b).
The next theorem is a lower bound on the expected distance between the vector output by
MOD-SULQ and the true top eigenvector. In order to get this lower bound, we construct a class of
data sets and use Theorem 9 to derive a bound on the minimax error over the class.
Theorem 11 (Utility bound for MOD-SULQ). Let d, n, and p > 0 be given and let β be given by
Algorithm 1 so that the output of MOD-SULQ is (p, δ)-differentially private for all data sets in Rd
with n elements. Then there exists a data set with n elements such that if vˆ1 denotes the output
of MOD-SULQ and v1 is the top eigenvector of the empirical covariance matrix of the data set, the
expected correlation 〈vˆ1, v1〉 is upper bounded:
E [|〈vˆ1, v1〉|] ≤ min
φ∈Φ
1− (1− φ)
4
1− 1/β2 + log 2
(d− 1) log 1√
1−φ2 − log(8)
2 , (21)
where
Φ ∈
[
max
{
1√
2pid
,
√
1− exp
(
−2 log(8d)
d− 1
)
,
√
1− exp
(
−2/β
2 + log(256)
d− 1
)}
, 1
)
. (22)
Proof. For φ ∈ [(2pid)−1/2, 1), Lemma 7 shows there exists a set of K unit vectors C such that for
µ, ν ∈ C, the inner product between them satisfies |〈µ, ν〉| < φ, where K is given by (12). Note
that for small φ this setting of K is loose, but any orthonormal basis provides d unit vectors which
are orthogonal, setting K = d and solving for φ yields(
1− exp
(
−2 log(8d)
d− 1
))1/2
.
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Setting the lower bound on φ to the maximum of these two yields the set of φ and K which we will
consider in (22).
For any unit vector µ, let
A(µ) = µµT +N,
where N is a d × d symmetric random matrix such that {Nij : 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d} are i.i.d. N (0, β2),
where β2 is the noise variance used in the MOD-SULQ algorithm. Due to symmetry, the matrix
A(µ) can be thought of as a jointly Gaussian random vector on the d(d+ 1)/2 variables {Aij(µ) :
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d}. The mean of this vector is
µ¯ =
(
µ21, µ
2
2, . . . , µ
2
d, µ1µ2, µ1µ3, . . . , µd−1µd
)T
,
and the covariance is β2Id(d+1)/2. Let fµ denote the density of this vector.
For µ, ν ∈ C, the divergence between fµ and fν can be calculated using Lemma 10:
KL (fµ‖fν) = 1
2
(µ¯− ν¯)TΣ−1(µ¯− ν¯)
=
1
2β2
‖µ¯− ν¯‖2
≤ 1
β2
. (23)
The last line follows from the fact that the vectors in C are unit norm.
For any two vectors µ, ν ∈ C, lower bound the Euclidean distance between them using the upper
bound on the inner product:
‖µ− ν‖ ≥
√
2(1− φ). (24)
Let Θ = Sd−1 with the Euclidean norm and R be the set of distributions {A(µ) : µ ∈ Θ}. From
(24) and (23), the set C satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9 with F = {fµ : µ ∈ C}, r = K,
τ =
√
2(1− φ), and γ = 1
β2
. The conclusion of the Theorem shows that for MOD-SULQ,
max
µ∈C
Efµ [‖vˆ − µ‖] ≥
√
2(1− φ)
2
(
1− 1/β
2 + log 2
logK
)
. (25)
This lower bound is vacuous when the term inside the parenthesis is negative, which imposes further
conditions on φ. Setting logK = 1/β2 + log 2, we can solve to find another lower bound on φ:
φ ≥
√
1− exp
(
−2/β
2 + log(256)
d− 1
)
.
This yields the third term in (22). Note that for larger n this term will dominate the others.
Using Jensen’s inequality on the the left side of (25):
max
µ∈C
Efµ [2(1− |〈vˆ, µ〉|)] ≥
(1− φ)
2
(
1− 1/β
2 + log 2
logK
)2
.
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So there exists a µ ∈ C such that
Efµ [|〈vˆ, µ〉|] ≤ 1−
(1− φ)
4
(
1− 1/β
2 + log 2
logK
)2
. (26)
Consider the data set consisting of n copies of µ. The corresponding covariance matrix is µµT with
top eigenvector v1 = µ. The output of the algorithm MOD-SULQ applied to this data set is an
estimator of µ and hence satisfies (26). Minimizing over φ gives the desired bound.
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Figure 1: Upper bound from Theorem 11 on the expected correlation between the true top eigenvector
and the vˆ1 produced by MOD-SULQ. The horizontal axis is log10(n) and the vertical axis shows the lower
bound in (21). The four panels correspond to different values of the dimension d, from 50 to 1000. Each
panel contains plots of the bound for different values of p.
The minimization over φ in (21) does not lead to analytically pretty results, so we plotted the
results in Figure 1 in order to get a sense of the bounds. Figure 1 shows the lower bound on the
expected correlation E [|〈vˆ1, v1〉|] as a function of the number of data points (given on a logarithmic
scale). Each panel shows a different dimension, from d = 50 to d = 1000, and plots are given for
different values of p ranging from 0.01 to 2. In all experiments we set δ = 0.01. In high dimension,
the lower bound shows that the expected performance of MOD-SULQ is poor when there are a
small number of data points. This limitation may be particularly acute when the data lies in a
very low dimensional subspace but is presented in very high dimension. In such “sparse” settings,
perturbing the input as in MOD-SULQ is not a good approach. However, in lower dimensions and
data-rich regimes, the performance may be more favorable.
A little calculation yields the sample complexity bound in Theorem 5
Proof. Suppose E [|〈vˆ1, v1〉|] = ρ. Then a little algebra shows
2
√
1− ρ ≥ min
φ∈Φ
√
1− φ
1− 1/β2 + log 2
(d− 1) log 1√
1−φ2 − log(8)
 .
21
Setting φ such that (d− 1) log 1√
1−φ2 − log(8) = 2(1/β
2 + log 2) we have
4
√
1− ρ ≥
√
1− φ.
Since we are concerned with the scaling behavior for large d and n, this implies
log
1√
1− φ2 = Θ
(
1
β2d
)
,
so
φ =
√
1− exp
(
−Θ
(
1
β2d
))
= Θ
(√
1
β2d
)
.
From Algorithm 1, to get for some constant c1, we have the following lower bound on β:
β2 > c1
d2
n22p
log(d/δ).
Substituting, we get for some constants c2 and c3 that
(1− c2(1− ρ)) ≤ c3
n22p
d3 log(d/δ)
.
Now solving for n shows
n ≥ cd
3/2
√
log(d/δ)
p
(
1− c′(1− ρ)) .
6 Experiments
We next turn to validating our theoretical results on real data. We implemented MOD-SULQ and
PPCA in order to test our theoretical bounds. Implementing PPCA involved using a Gibbs sampling
procedure (Hoff, 2009). A crucial parameter in MCMC procedures is the burn-in time, which is
how long the chain must be run for it to reach its stationary distribution. Theoretically, chains
reach their stationary distribution only in the limit; however, in practice MCMC users must sample
after some finite time. In order to use this procedure appropriately, we determined a burn-in time
using our data sets. The interaction of MCMC procedures and differential privacy is a rich area
for future research.
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Dataset #instances #dimensions k qF(Vk) qF(Vk)/ ‖A‖F
kddcup 494,021 116 4 0.6587 0.96
census 199,523 513 8 0.7321 0.81
localization 164,860 44 10 0.5672 0.81
insurance 9,822 150 11 0.5118 0.81
Table 1: Parameters of each dataset. The second column is the number of dimensions after pre-
processing. k is the dimensionality of the PCA, the third column contains qF(Vk), where Vk is the
top-k PCA subspace, and the fifth column is the normalized utility qF(Vk)/ ‖A‖F.
6.1 Data and preprocessing
We report on the performance of our algorithm on some real datasets. We chose four datasets
from four different domains—kddcup99 (Bache and Lichman, 2013), which includes features of
494,021 network connections, census (Bache and Lichman, 2013), a demographic data set on
199,523 individuals, localization (Kaluzˇa et al., 2010), a medical dataset with 164,860 instances
of sensor readings on individuals engaged in different activities, and insurance (van der Putten
and van Someren, 2000), a dataset on product usage and demographics of 9,822 individuals.
These datasets contain a mix of continuous and categorical features. We preprocessed each
dataset by converting a feature with q discrete values to a vector in {0, 1}q; after preprocessing, the
datasets kddcup99, census, localization and insurance have dimensions 116, 513, 44 and 150
respectively. We also normalized each row so that each entry has maximum value 1, and normalize
each column such that the maximum (Euclidean) column norm is 1. We choose k = 4 for kddcup,
k = 8 for census, k = 10 for localization and k = 11 for insurance; in each case, the utility
qF(Vk) of the top-k PCA subspace of the data matrix accounts for at least 80% of ‖A‖F. Thus, all
four datasets, although fairly high dimensional, have good low-dimensional representations. The
properties of each dataset are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.2 Implementation of Gibbs sampling
The theoretical analysis of PPCA uses properties of the Bingham distribution BMFk(·) given in
(6). To implement this algorithm for experiments we use a Gibbs sampler due to Hoff (2009).
The Gibbs sampling scheme induces a Markov Chain, the stationary distribution of which is the
density in (6). Gibbs sampling and other MCMC procedures are widely used in statistics, scientific
modeling, and machine learning to estimate properties of complex distributions Brooks (1998).
Finding the speed of convergence of MCMC methods is still an open area of research. There has
been much theoretical work on estimating convegence times (Jones and Hobart, 2004; Douc et al.,
2004; Jones and Hobart, 2001; Roberts, 1999; Roberts and Sahu, 2001; Roberts, 1999; Roberts and
Sahu, 2001; Rosenthal, 1995; Kolassa, 1999, 2000), but unfortunately, most theoretical guarantees
are available only in special cases and are often too weak for practical use. In lieu of theoretical
guarantees, users of MCMC methods empirically estimate the burn-in time, or the number of iter-
ations after which the chain is sufficiently close to its stationary distribution. Statisticians employ
a range of diagnostic methods and statistical tests to empirically determine if the Markov chain
is close to stationarity (Cowles and Carlin, 1996; Brooks and Roberts, 1998; Brooks and Gelman,
1998; El Adlouni et al., 2006). These tests do not provide a sufficient guarantee of stationarity, and
there is no “best test” to use. In practice, the convergence of derived statistics is used to estimate
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an appropriate the burn-in time. In the case of the Bingham distribution, Hoff (2009) performs
qualitative measures of convergence. Developing a better characterization of the convergence of
this Gibbs sampler is an important question for future work.
Because the MCMC procedure of Hoff (2009) does not come with convergence-time guarantees,
for our experiments we had to choose an appropriate burn-in time. The “ideal” execution of PPCA
provides p-differential privacy, but because our implementation only approximates sampling from
the Bingham distribution, we cannot guarantee that this implementation provides the privacy
guarantee. As noted by Mironov (2012), even current implementations of floating-point arithmetic
may suffer from privacy problems, so there is still significant work to do between theory and
implementation. For this paper we tried to find a burn-in time that was sufficiently long so that
we could be confident that the empirical performance of PPCA was not affected by the initial
conditions of the sampler.
In order to choose an appropriate burn-in time, we examined the time series trace of the Markov
Chain. We ran l copies, or traces, of the chain, starting from l different initial locations drawn
uniformly from the set of all d × k matrices with orthonormal columns. Let Xi(t) be the output
of the i-th copy at iteration t, and let U be the top-k PCA subspace of the data. We used the
following statistic as a function of iteration T :
F ik(T ) =
1√
k
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
Xi(t)
∥∥∥∥∥
F
,
where || · ||F is the Frobenius norm. The matrix Bingham distribution has mean 0, and hence with
increasing T , the statistic F ik(T ) should converge to 0.
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Figure 2: Plots of logF ik(T ) for five different traces (values of i) on two different data sets. Figure 2(a)
shows logF ik(T ) for for k = 4 as a function of iteration T for 40, 000 steps of the Gibbs sampler on the
kddcup dataset. Figure 2(b) shows the same for the insurance dataset.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the Gibbs sampler. The plots show the value of logF ik(T )
as a function of the Markov chain iteration for 5 different restarts of the MCMC procedure for two
data sets, kddcup and insurance. The initial starting points were chosen uniformly from the set
of all d× k matrices with orthonormal columns. The plots show that F ik(T ) decreases rapidly after
a few thousand iterations, and is less than 0.01 after T = 20,000 in both cases. logF ik(T ) also
appears to have a larger variance for kddcup than for insurance; this is explained by the fact that
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the kddcup dataset has a much larger number of samples, which makes its stationary distribution
farther from the initial distribution of the sampler. Based on these and other simulations, we
observed that the Gibbs sampler converges to Fk(t) < 0.01 at t = 20,000 when run on data with a
few hundred dimensions and with k between 5 and 10; we thus chose to run the Gibbs sampler for
T = 20,000 timesteps for all the datasets.
Our simulations indicate that the chains converge fairly rapidly, particularly when ‖A−Ak‖F is
small so that Ak is a good approximation to A. Convergence is slower for larger n when the initial
state is chosen from the uniform distribution over all k×d matrices with orthonormal columns; this
is explained by the fact that for larger n, the stationary distribution is farther in variation distance
from the starting distribution, which results in a longer convergence time.
6.3 Scaling with data set size
We ran three algorithms on these data sets : standard (non-private) PCA, MOD-SULQ, and PPCA.
As a sanity check, we also tried a uniformly generated random projection—since this projection is
data-independent we would expect it to have low utility. We measured the utility qF(U), where U
is the k-dimensional subspace output by the algorithm; qF(U) is maximized when U is the top-k
PCA subspace, and thus this reflects how close the output subspace is to the true PCA subspace in
terms of representing the data. Although our theoretical results hold for qA(·), the “energy” qF(·)
is more relevant in practice for larger k.
To investigate how well these different algorithms performed on real data, for each data set
we subsampled data sets of different sizes n uniformly and ran the algorithms on the subsets. We
chose p = 0.1 for this experiment, and for MOD-SULQ we used δ = 0.01. We averaged over 5 such
subsets and over several instances of the randomized algorithms (10 restarts for PPCA and 100 for
MOD-SULQ and random projections). For each subset and instance we calculated the resulting
utility qF(·) of the output subspace.
Figures 3(a), 3(b), 4(a), and 4(b) show qF(U) as a function of the subsampled data set sizes.
The bars indicate the standard deviation over the restarts (from subsampling the data and random
sampling for privacy). The non-private algorithm achieved qF(Vk) for nearly all subset sizes (see
Table 6.1 for the values). These plots illustrate how additional data can improve the utility of the
output for a fixed privacy level p. As n increases, the dashed blue line indicating the utility of
PPCA begins to approach qF(Vk), the utility of the optimal subspace.
These experiments also show that the performance of PPCA is significantly better than that of
MOD-SULQ, and MOD-SULQ produces subspaces whose utility is on par with randomly choosing a
subspace. The only exception to this latter point is localization, We believe this is because d is
much lower for this data set (d = 44), which shows that for low dimension and large n, MOD-SULQ
may produce subspaces with reasonable utility. Furthermore, MOD-SULQ is simpler and hence runs
faster than PPCA, which requires running the Gibbs sampler past the burn-in time. Our theoretical
results suggest that the performance of differentially private PCA cannot be significantly improved
over the performance of PPCA but since those results hold for k = 1 they do not immediately
apply here.
6.4 Effect of privacy on classification
A common use of a dimension reduction algorithm is as a precursor to classification or clustering;
to evaluate the effectiveness of the different algorithms, we projected the data onto the subspace
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Figure 3: Plot of the unnormalized utility qF(U) versus the sample size n, averaged over random subsets of
the data and randomness in the algorithms. The bars are at one standard deviation about the mean. The
top red line is the PCA algorithm without privacy constraints. The dashed line in blue is the utility for
PPCA. The green and purple dashed lines are nearly indistinguishable and represent the utility from random
projections and MOD-SULQ, respectively. In these plots p = 0.1 and δ = 0.01.
kddcup99 localization
Non-private PCA 98.97± 0.05 100± 0
PPCA 98.95± 0.05 100± 0
MOD-SULQ 98.18± 0.65 97.06± 2.17
Random Projections 98.23± 0.49 96.28± 2.34
Table 2: Classification accuracy in the k-dimensional subspaces for kddcup99 (k = 4), and
localization (k = 10) in the k-dimensional subspaces reported by the different algorithms.
output by the algorithms, and measured the classification accuracy using the projected data. The
classification results are summarized in Table 6.4. We chose the normal vs. all classification task
in kddcup99, and the falling vs. all classification task in localization. 1 We used a linear SVM
for all classification tasks, which is implemented by libSVM (Chang and Lin, 2011).
For the classification experiments, we used half of the data as a holdout set for computing a
projection subspace. We projected the classification data onto the subspace computed based on
the holdout set; 10% of this data was used for training and parameter-tuning, and the rest for
testing. We repeated the classification process 5 times for 5 different (random) projections for each
algorithm, and then ran the entire procedure over 5 random permutations of the data. Each value
in the figure is thus an average over 5× 5 = 25 rounds of classification.
The classification results show that our algorithm performs almost as well as non-private PCA
for classification in the top-k PCA subspace, while the performance of MOD-SULQ and random
projections are a little worse. The classification accuracy while using MOD-SULQ and random
projections also appears to have higher variance compared to our algorithm and non-private PCA.
This is because the projections tend to be farther from the top-k PCA subspace, making the
classification error more variable.
1For the other two datasets, census and insurance, the classification accuracy of linear SVM after (non-private)
PCAs is as low as always predicting the majority label.
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Figure 4: Plot of the unnormalized utility qF(U) versus the sample size n, averaged over random subsets
of the data and randomness in the algorithms. The bars are at one standard deviation about the mean.
The top red line is the PCA algorithm without privacy constraints. The dashed line in blue is the utility
for PPCA. The green and purple dashed lines are nearly indistinguishable for insurance but diverge for
localization—they represent the utility from random projections and MOD-SULQ, respectively. In these
plots p = 0.1 and δ = 0.01.
6.5 Effect of the privacy requirement
How to choose p is important open question for many applications. We wanted to understand
the impact of varying p on the utility of the subspace. We did this via a synthetic data set—
we generated n = 5,000 points drawn from a Gaussian distribution in d = 10 with mean 0 and
covariance matrix with eigenvalues
{0.5, 0.30, 0.04, 0.03, 0.02, 0.01, 0.004, 0.003, 0.001, 0.001}. (27)
In this case the space spanned by the top two eigenvectors has most of the energy, so we chose
k = 2 and plotted the utility qF(·) for non-private PCA, MOD-SULQ with δ = 0.05, and PPCA
with a burn-in time of T = 1000. We drew 100 samples from each privacy-preserving algorithm
and the plot of the average utility versus p is shown in Figure 5. The privacy requirement relaxes
as p increases, and both MOD-SULQ and PPCA approach the utility of PCA without privacy
constraints. However, for moderate p PPCA still captures most of the utility, whereas the gap
between MOD-SULQ and PPCA becomes quite large.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the theoretical and empirical performance of differentially private
approximations to PCA. Empirically, we showed that MOD-SULQ and PPCA differ markedly in
how well they approximate the top-k subspace of the data. The reason for this, theoretically, is
that the sample complexity of MOD-SULQ scales as d3/2
√
log d whereas PPCA scales as d. Because
PPCA uses the exponential mechanism with qF(·) as the utility function, it is not surprising that it
performs well. However, MOD-SULQ often had a performance comparable to random projections,
indicating that the real data sets had too few points for it to be effective. We furthermore showed
that PPCA is nearly optimal, in that any differentially private approximation to PCA must use
Ω(d) samples.
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Figure 5: Plot of qF(U) versus p for a synthetic data set with n = 5,000, d = 10, and k = 2. The
data has a Gaussian distribution whose covariance matrix has eigenvalues given by (27).
Our investigation brought up many interesting issues to consider for future work. The descrip-
tion of differentially private algorithms assume an ideal model of computation : real systems require
additional security assumptions that have to be verified. The difference between truly random noise
and pseudorandomness and the effects of finite precision can lead to a gap between the theoretical
ideal and practice. Numerical optimization methods used in some privacy methods (Chaudhuri
et al., 2011) can only produce approximate solutions; they may also have complex termination
conditions unaccounted for in the theoretical analysis. MCMC sampling is similar : if we can guar-
antee that the sampler’s distribution has total variation distance δ from the Bingham distribution,
then sampler can guarantee (p, δ) differential privacy. However, we do not yet have such analytical
bounds on the convergence rate; we must determine the Gibbs sampler’s convergence empirically.
Accounting for these effects is an interesting avenue for future work that can bring theory and
practice together.
For PCA more specifically, it would be interesting to extend the sample complexity results to
general k > 1. For k = 1 the utility functions qF(·) and qA(·) are related, but for larger k it
is not immediately clear what metric best captures the idea of “approximating” the top-k PCA
subspace. For minimax lower bounds, it may be possible to construct a packing with respect to
a general utility metric. For example, Kapralov and Talwar (2013) use properties of packings on
the Grassmann manifold. Upper bounds on the sample complexity for PPCA may be possible by
performing a more careful analysis of the Bingham distribution or by finding better approximations
for its normalizing constant. Developing a framework for analyzing general approximations to PCA
may be of interest more broadly in machine learning.
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A A packing lemma
The proof of this lemma is relatively straightforward. The following is a slight refinement of a
lemma due to Csisza´r and Narayan (1988, 1991).
Lemma 12. Let Z1,Z2, . . . ,ZN be arbitrary random variables and let fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) be arbitrary
with 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then the condition
E [fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi)|Z1, . . . ,Zi−1] ≤ ai a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N
implies that
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) > t
)
≤ exp
(
−Nt(log 2) +
N∑
i=1
ai
)
.
Proof. First apply Markov’s inequality:
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) > t
)
= P
(
2
∑N
i=1 fi(Z1,...,Zi) > 2Nt
)
≤ 2−NtE
[
2
∑N
i=1 fi(Z1,...,Zi)
]
≤ 2−NtE
[
2
∑N−1
i=1 fi(Z1,...,Zi)E
[
2fN (Z1,...,ZN )|Z1, . . . ,ZN−1
]]
.
Now note that for b ∈ [0, 1] we have 2b ≤ 1 + b ≤ eb, so
E
[
2fN (Z1,...,ZN )|Z1, . . . ,ZN−1
]
≤ E [1 + fN (Z1, . . . ,ZN )|Z1, . . . ,ZN−1]
≤ (1 + aN )
≤ exp(aN ).
Therefore
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) > t
)
≤ exp(−Nt(log 2) + aN )E
[
2
∑N−1
i=1 fi(Z1,...,Zi)
]
.
Continuing in the same way yields
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) > t
)
≤ exp
(
−Nt(log 2) +
N∑
i=1
ai
)
.
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The second technical lemma (Csisza´r and Narayan, 1991, Lemma 2) is a basic result about the
distribution of inner product between a randomly chosen unit vector and any other fixed vector. It
is a consequence of a result of Shannon (Shannon, 1959) on the distribution of the angle between
a uniformly distributed unit vector and a fixed unit vector.
Lemma 13 (Lemma 2 of Csisza´r and Narayan (1991)). Let U be uniformly distributed on the unit
sphere Sd−1 in Rd. Then for every unit vector u on this sphere and any φ ∈ [(2pid)−1/2, 1), the
following inequality holds:
P (〈U,u〉 ≥ φ) ≤ (1− φ2)(d−1)/2.
Lemma 14 (Packing set on the unit sphere). Let the dimension d and parameter φ ∈ [(2pid)−1/2, 1)
be given. For N and t satisfying
−Nt(log 2) +N(N − 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2 < 0 (28)
there exists a set of K = b(1− t)Nc unit vectors C such that for all distinct pairs µ, ν ∈ C,
|〈µ, ν〉| < φ. (29)
Proof. The goal is to generate a set of N unit vectors on the surface of the sphere Sd−1 such that
they have large pairwise distances or, equivalently, small pairwise inner products. To that end,
define i.i.d. random variables Z1,Z2, . . . ,ZN uniformly distributed on Sd−1 and functions
fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) = 1 (|〈Zi,Zj〉| > φ, j < i) .
That is, fi = 1 if Zi has large inner product with any Zj for j < i. The conditional expectation,
by a union bound and Lemma 13, is
E [fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi)|Z1, . . . ,Zi−1] ≤ 2(i− 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2.
Let ai = 2(i− 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2. Then
N∑
i=1
ai = N(N − 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2.
Then Lemma 12 shows
P
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(Z1, . . . ,Zi) > t
)
≤ exp
(
−Nt(log 2) +N(N − 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2
)
.
This inequality implies that as long as
−Nt(log 2) +N(N − 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2 < 0,
then there is a finite probability that {Zi} contains a subset {Z′i} of size b(1 − t)Nc such that∣∣∣〈Z′i,Z′j〉∣∣∣ < φ for all (i, j). Therefore such a set exists.
A simple setting of the parameters gives the packing in Lemma 7.
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Proof. Applying Lemma 14 yields a set of K vectors C satisfying (28) and (29). To get a simple
bound that’s easy to work with, we can set
−Nt(log 2) +N(N − 1)(1− φ2)(d−1)/2 = 0,
and find an N close to this. Setting ψ = (1− φ2)(d−1)/2, and solving for N we see
N = 1 +
t log 2
ψ
>
t
2ψ
.
Now setting K = t(1−t)2ψ and t = 1/2 gives (12). So there exists a set of K vectors on S
d−1 whose
pairwise inner products are smaller than φ.
The maximum set of points that can be selected on a sphere of dimension d such that their
pairwise inner products are bounded by φ is an open question. These sets are sometimes referred to
as spherical codes (Conway and Sloane, 1998) because they correspond to a set of signaling points
of dimension d that can be perfectly decoded over a channel with bounded noise. The bounds here
are from a probabilistic construction and can be tightened for smaller d. However, in terms of
scaling with d this construction is essentially optimal (Shannon, 1959).
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